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Abstract 
 
Macau has boomed over the last decade as its gaming industry has provided the 
massive Chinese economy with the only legal casino gambling services in the 
nation. But, recent Chinese political changes have resulted in a sharp downturn in 
Macau’s gambling revenues despite a major expansion of its gaming facilities. 
This may negatively impact efforts to promote a relationship between Macau and 
the Portuguese Speaking World. Portugal with its former Ultramar, to which 
Brazil has been added, is now termed “Lusophonia.” Initiated by China in Macau 
in October 2003, the efforts to promote a Lusophone trade and economic 
relationship with China through Macau have not resulted in any significant trade 
or tourist links between Macau and Lusophonia. Despite China’s trade with 
Brazil booming following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 
2001, its Brazilian trade is routed either through China itself or Hong Kong, not 
through Macau. Macau’s significantly weak links to Lusophonia, which were 
predictable from international trade theory that included the Gravity Model and 
Ghemawat’s CAGE analytical model, were not enhanced during Macau’s 10 year 
boom from 2004 to 2014, and may be forced to take a back seat to the re-
positioning of its gaming industry over the next several years.  
 
Macau and Lusophonia 
 
Two-pronged efforts to develop a community of nations that utilize the 
Portuguese language have been in evidence for the last 20 years, one effort 
undertaken through the Portuguese government sponsored Comunidade dos Países 
de Linguas Portuguese, which was founded in February 1994, and the other effort 
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through the China-sponsored “Macau Forum” (中葡论坛)1 that was setup in the 
Macau Special Administrative Region (Macau SAR) by China’s central 
government in October 2003. Despite Macau’s population being well over 90% 
Chinese and with the Cantonese dialect dominating all commercial activities, 
Macau is considered to be a member of the Lusophone grouping due to its status 
as having both Chinese and Portuguese as official languages. The Macau Forum 
was established to strengthen economic and trade relationships, not cultural 
relations, between China (not solely Macau) and the Portuguese-speaking world, 
hence its name “Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and 
the Portuguese Language Countries” (中国与葡语国家经贸合作论坛).  
Following the Macau’s return to China in December 1999 and coincidentally 
with the 40th anniversary of the U.S.-China Shanghai Communiqué, Macau’s first 
chief executive, Edmund Ho Hou-hua (何厚鏵), opened Macau’s gaming market 
to international casino operators in February 2002. The city’s economy then 
boomed on the back of a wave of gamblers from Macau’s neighboring Guangdong 
province who poured into the city subsequent to the opening of its first 
international casino in May 2004 (Las Vegas Sands). Macau’s traditional source 
of gamblers from Hong Kong dropped into second place. The combination of 
Macau being the only legal gambling jurisdiction in China and the spectacular rise 
of China’s purchasing power following China’s December 2001 entry into the 
World Trade Organization, attracted as much as US$15-20 billion of investments 
into the city’s gaming facilities between 2004 and 2014. As Macau’s gaming 
revenues ballooned 15 times from 2002’s (Macau Pataca currency or MOP) 23.5 
billion (US$2.9b) to 2014’s MOP 352.7 billion (US$ 44.1b), Macau’s GDP grew 
by a spectacular 850% from 2001’s MOP 52.3 billion (US$ 6.5b) to 2014’s MOP 
443.3 billion (US$ 55b) (Macau Government, 2016). Macau surpassed Las Vegas 
as the world’s largest gaming center in 2007. Over the next several years, between 
2014 and 2018 the casino industry is again doubling the size of its gaming 
infrastructure through the investment of US$ 22 billion in new casino and hotels. 
Just as this was launched, however, Macau’s economy shrank 16.85% due to a 
crackdown on corruption in China that the new central government leadership of 
Xi Jin-ping (習近平) had begun in mid-2014.  
How might Macau’s gaming-based economy interface with the remarkably 
diversified Lusophone markets? A recent study by Macau’s University of Saint 
Joseph attempted to make marketing sense of the collection of remarkably diverse 
Lusophone states. Six separate Lusophone sectors were identified: (i) Brazil, (ii) 
Portugal, (iii) Angola, (iv) Mozambique, (v) Timor-Goa, and (vi) Cabo Verde-
Guineas Bissau-Sao Tome. The importance of Brazil was clear: Brazil’s GDP is 
six times larger than that of all the remaining Lusophone markets combined, 
making Brazil the prime target for any strategy which seeks to promote a “greater 
                                                          
1 ‘Permanent Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China 
and the Portuguese Language Countries’; Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e 
Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa.  
Paul B. Spooner 139 
 
Lusophone” commercial network. The table that follows identifies the six sectors, 
based on their diffuse economic, geographic, and demographic characteristics.  
The data demonstrates that the priority relationship on which to build both 
China and Macau’s Lusophone economic interface is trade and investment with 
Brazil. Such trade relationship might be both an effective stimulant to the 
international Lusophone community and a way to diversify Macau’s heavy 
reliance upon Cantonese gamblers from South China. 
 
Table 1: Lusophone Markets 
 
    To Status   
 Pop GDP-PPP GDP US$ Macau CPIA: 6-0 % 1st Key 
Country (000s) Billion US$ Per Capita Hours MPI: 87 Catholic City & Pop 
Brazil 202,656 US$3,073.0 US$15,200 -11 20 MPI 64.6% 20.8m: Sao Paulo 
Portugal 10,813 US$276.0 US$26,300 -7 60 MPI 81.0% 2.8m: Lisbon 
Macau (SAR) 660 US$51.8 US$88,700 0 - 6.7% .66 Macau 
Angola 19,088 US$175.5 US$8,200 -7 2.83-CP 38.0% 5.3m: Luanda 
Mozambique 24,692 US$29.8 US$1,100 -6 3.67-CP 28.4% 1.2m: Maputo 
Timor-Leste 1,201 US$8.4 US$6,800 1 2.83-CP 96.9% 0.2m: Dili 
Goa 1,457 US$7.7 US$5,284 -1.5 - 26.6% 0.11m: Panaji 
Cabo Verde 538 US$3.3 US$6,300 -9 3.83-CP 77.3% 0.14m: Praia 
Guinea Bissau 1,693 US$2.5 US$1,400 -8 3.00-CP 22.1% 0.47m: Bissau 
Sao Tome 190 US$0.6 US$3,100 -8 3.00-CP 55.7% .071m: Sao Tome 
 
The above data also shows that the development of Macau economic 
relationships with the Lusophone nations is significantly constrained by the 
recognition that the Lusophone markets are not only of great distance from 
Macau, but also, with the exception of Brazil, are not of a substantial size. Trade 
theorists have expressed the difficulty of developing trade between distant and 
relatively small GDPs via the Gravity Model of international trade (Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 2007). This model has empirically demonstrated that bilateral trade 
between two nations is negatively correlated to distance and positively correlated 
to GDP. Here lies the great problem for developing trade between Macau and its 
Lusophone partners. The only Lusophone areas in reasonable proximity to Macau 
are Timor-Leste and Goa. Time zone differences express the relationship. With 
Timor being one hour ahead of Macau time and Goa 1.5 hours behind, both are 
theoretically within the city’s manageable sphere. But, not only are their GDP’s 
and markets small, they are fraught with political problems. Within Goa there is 
ongoing tension between the Hindu and Catholic communities, while Timor is 
only just now recovering from a socially devastating separation from Indonesia. 
Time zone differences also show that Macau is remote from the rest of the 
Lusophone world, with Brazil being in a zone 11 hours distant and Portugal and 
Angola seven hours off. In the IMF trade statistics that follow, low trade levels 
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between Macau and the rest of Lusophonia, which the Gravity Model of trade 
predicts, are in evidence.  
Further, in recent years Pankaj Ghemawat at Harvard Business School has 
expanded the two variable scope of the Gravity Model (distance and economic 
size) to include cultural and political variables in an effort to predict likelihood of 
cross-border investment success (Ghemawat, 2007). His CAGE model, which 
includes Cultural, Administrative-Political, Geographic, and Economic variables, 
clearly recommends that Macau’s economic relations (and any investment 
strategy that its companies may wish to undertaken) should be concentrated in the 
region of Greater China. Not only is China (the world’s second largest economy) 
on Macau’s doorstep, Macau is in fact an actual part of China. Gravity Theory 
predicts that Macau’s trade will be in the close orbit of Macau’s massive 
sovereign authority. The pull of Brazil, Portugal, and Angola will be only dimly 
felt. Ghemawat’s CAGE model reinforces the reality that Macau’s economic 
relationships will be inextricable from China. Macau is substantially a Chinese 
cultural entity, with only a residual Portuguese cultural linguistic influence, while 
its political and legal development is directly under Beijing’s control. The CAGE 
Model recommends that Macau look for economic diversification and success in 
Greater China, and that Macau’s theoretical Lusophone connection will not be a 
major determinant of the city’s economic future. Trade data that follows supports 
the conclusions of both the Gravity Model and Ghemawat’s CAGE methodology.  
 
China Lusophone’s Trade 
 
The first constraint on Macau trade with Lusophonia is the fact that these nations 
are not China’s major export markets or suppliers. IMF data demonstrates that the 
Lusophone nations represented only 1.78% of China’s exports in 2015, an amount 
that was reduced from the slightly larger, but still small 2.12% in 2014. The 
United States, with 18% of China’s total exports in 2015, is China’s most 
significant international partner.2 Within Lusophonia, Brazil is by far the largest 
market for Chinese goods, having absorbed $27.4 billion in 2015 or 1.2% of 
China’s total exports. Four of the other Lusophone markets that included Macau, 
Angola, Portugal, and Mozambique accounted for only 0.5% of China’s exports or 
US$13.2 billion. The smaller Portuguese speaking nations of Cabo Verde, Guinea 
Bissau, Principe and Sao Tome, and Timor-Leste, have little status in China’s 
external trade relations.3 As suppliers to China, IMF data for Lusophonia 
demonstrates that only Brazil and Angola are providing any significant level of 
resources. Of China’s imports in 2015 Lusophonia held 3.9%. Brazil shipped 
                                                          
2 Exports to the United States are larger than Hong Kong market which took 14.6% of 
China’s exports. The European Union took 11.0%. 
3 Trade statistics between China and Timor-Leste are not provided thru the IMF Direction 
of Trade data, but the Macau Forum intermittently provides data in articles and excerpts 
from China’s own customs data. Appendix I presents China’s trade with these countries for 
nine months of 2015, which amounted to Timor, US$62.8m, Cabo Verde, US$ 35.3m, 
Guinea Bissau, US$ 30.1m, and Sao Tome, US$ 4.5m.  
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2.77% and Angola just 1%. Portugal provided just 0.1%, while the remainder of 
Lusophonia barely registered in the statistics.  
 
China-Brazil Trade 
 
Trade between Brazil and China boomed following the fall 2001 U.S. agreement 
to allow China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), shortly after the 
events of September 2001 took place. In 2013 China-Brazil trade hit a record of 
US$ 83.3 billion, over 20 times the size of trade in 2001 (US$4.0 billion), the year 
before China entered the WTO. Minimal trade between China and Brazil had 
existed as little as 16 years ago, with only US$1.1 billion in 2000 (Could Macau 
be the Bridge, 2011), an extraordinary low level given the population, economies, 
and land area of the two states. After China’s entry onto the WTO, trade radically 
expanded and paralleled the explosive growth of Macau’s own economy. By 2009 
China had become Brazil’s largest trading partner and Macau the largest gaming 
market in the world. But, Macau-Brazil trade remained negligible (Sohn, 2012). 
 
Table 2: China’s Exports to Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade China, 2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 2,343,220.90 100.0% 2,280,539.58 100.0% -15.1% 
United States 397,099.31 16.9% 410,782.82 18.0% 3.4% 
Hong Kong 363,222.84 15.5% 332,728.41 14.6% -8.4% 
Euro Area 266,887.70 11.4% 250,678.98 11.0% -6.1% 
Brazil 34,925.22 1.490% 27,428.47 1.203% -21.5% 
Angola 5,976.27 0.255% 3,722.32 0.163% -37.7% 
Portugal 3,137.25 0.134% 2,898.65 0.127% -7.6% 
Mozambique 1,969.90 0.084% 1,941.03 0.085% -1.5% 
Cabo Verde 51.22 0.002% 44.92 0.002% -12.3% 
Timor-Leste4 n.d n.d n.d. n.d. n.d 
Guinea-Bissau 17.12 0.001% 19.45 0.001% 13.6% 
São Tomé 5.73 0.000% 7.87 0.000% 37.4% 
Macao 3,605.91 0.154% 4,614.75 0.202% 28.0% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 
w/o Brazil 14,763.40 0.630% 13,249.00 0.581% -10.3% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 49,688.62 2.121% 40,677.47 1.784% -18.135% 
 
Despite a trade slowdown in 2015 that moderated economic growth in China 
and produced recession in Brazil, Brazil-China trade remained substantial and by 
far the largest of Lusophone nations. For 2015 the Financial Times reported 
                                                          
4 IMF does not break out data for Timor-Leste in its Direction of Trade statistics. China 
data shows a level near Cabo Verde.  
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Brazil’s China trade slumping 20% to $66.3b (Leahy, 2016), while Brazil 
government statistics show imports from China falling to US$30.7 billion, down a 
sharp -17.74% over 2014. Brazilian exports to China also were down, but by a 
smaller -12.3%. These dropped from 2014’s US$ 40.6 billion to 2015’s US$35.6 
billion. Brazil’s exports to China have been highly concentrated (65% in 2015) in 
unprocessed iron ore and soybeans, with Brazil’s major ore producer, Vale do Rio 
Doce, generating fully 33% of its sales through shipments to China (Hayashi & 
Lima, 2015). In a near classic colonial relationship, Brazil is source of raw 
materials to China, and a market for its manufactured goods: of the US$35.6 
billion in Brazilian exports in 2015, nearly 80% (US$28.6b) were raw materials, 
while 97% of Brazil’s imports from China were manufactured goods. Fortunately 
Brazil has enjoyed a positive trade balance with China, which in 2015 rose 
modestly, increasing from 2014’s US$3.3b in 2014 to 2015’s US$4.9b (Brazil 
Ministério, 2016). Despite Brazil’s poor economic conditions, its overall trade 
balance swung sharply into the black, with a trade surplus of US$19.7b versus a 
deficit of –US$4.05 in 2014. Matching the same percentage drop in trade with 
China, Brazil’s total 2015 trade volume was down –20.4%, with total trade 
standing at only US$ 379.7 billion versus US$477 billion in 2014 (International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, External Trade by Counterparts Brazil, 2016).  
 
Table 3: China Imports from Lusophonia (US$ millions) 
(International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade China, 2016) 
 
 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 1,963,105.18 100.0% 1,601,760.79 100.0% -15.1% 
Euro Area 197,659.68 10.1% 169,029.34 10.6% -14.5% 
United States 154,136.22 7.9% 144,867.08 9.0% -6.0% 
Hong Kong 12,920.24 0.7% 8,161.48 0.5% -36.8% 
Brazil 51,975.64 2.648% 44,380.37 2.771% -14.6% 
Angola 31,094.94 1.584% 15,983.16 0.998% -48.6% 
Portugal 1,664.86 0.085% 1,471.84 0.092% -11.6% 
Mozambique 1,653.01 0.084% 451.98 0.028% -72.7% 
Cabo Verde 0.00 0.000% 2.00 0.000% 0.0% 
Timor-Leste n.d n.d n.d. n.d. n.d 
Guinea-Bissau 49.96 0.003% 17.81 0.001% -64.3% 
São Tomé 0.00 0.000% 0.03 0.000% 868.5% 
Macao 210.30 0.011% 183.23 0.011% -12.9% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 
w/o Brazil 34,673.07 1.766% 18,110.05 1.131% -47.8% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 86,648.71 4.414% 62,490.42 3.901% -27.881% 
 
Trade Relationshiops: Brazil, China, Macau, and Hong Kong 
 
A central issue for Macau in its relationships with the Lusophone world is the 
extent of its relationship with Brazil. Over the last 50 years there have been 
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sporadic attempts that were unsuccessful in developing the relationship. Brazil’s 
largest bank, the Banco do Brasil, opened a branch office on June 23, 1980, four 
decades ago, on the Avenida Praia Grande while Brazil was still under military 
rule, and two decades ago on July 16, 1994, Brazil’s Minister of Aeronautics 
signed Macau’s first international air transport agreement in anticipation of 
Macau’s new international airport that opened late that year. These initiatives did 
not produce significant results. The impact of the Second Oil Crisis on Brazil’s 
domestic and international financial affairs forced Banco do Brasil to close its 
little used offices by the mid-1980s. And, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 made 
uneconomic the air transport links directly from Europe to Macau. Portugal’s 
national carrier, TAP, abandoned its flights from Portugal to Macau 18 months 
later in November of 1998 (Sá, 1999, p. 105). Even as Asia recovered from its 
crisis, Brazil’s major airline, Varig, faced its own difficulties and was forced into 
bankruptcy by 2005 (Varig Files, 2005,).5  
The level of interaction between Brazil and Macau remains surprisingly 
minimal given the size of the Brazilian economy and the increasing prosperity of 
Macau. In July 1989 the Brazilian “Casa de Macau” began operations in São 
Paulo, with another house opening in Rio de Janeiro two years later. The Casa de 
Macau in São Paulo, however, is relatively small, despite it being the largest 
organization of the Macanese Diaspora. By the 1980s it consisted of 
approximately 300 individuals. The Japanese-Brazilian Community of São Paulo 
and Paraná, which totaled 1.5 million (Duffy, 2008), vastly dwarfed the Macau’s 
Casa. Importantly, in Asia, the Japanese Brazilians residents in Japan number over 
300k (Spacey, 2009) and represent approximately 50% of the entire population of 
Macau. Brazil’s ethnic and cultural relationships with Japan undoubtedly carry far 
greater influence than Macau’s small expatriate community. As demonstrated in 
the graph below, Macau’s total population, which has grown from 490,000 in 
2006 to 640,000 in 2016, is little larger than Japanese Brazilians resident in Japan 
(Macau Population, 2016). 
Brazilians have also been prominent in some of Macau’s most important 
sporting events, including the Macau Grand Prix and International Women’s 
Volleyball, but these participations appear not to have been part of a wider 
Macau-Brazil organizational development. The acclaimed Brazilian driver Ayrton 
Senna da Silva won Macau’s inaugural Formula 3 Grand Prix in November of 
1983, and Maurício Gugelmin won two years later in 1985. Two decades later in 
2005, Lucas di Grass was the champion of the 52nd Macau Grand Prix, while in 
2013’s 60th year-Diamond Jubilee Anniversary race “Pipo” Derani finished third. 
The globally top-ranked Brazilian Women’s Volleyball Team has also regularly 
played in major tournaments in Macau against China, Russia, and the United 
States, including the 2011 International Federation of Volley Ball (FIVB) 
Championship, and again in the recently completed June 2016 Grand Prix that 
                                                          
5 The SARS crisis hit Asia in the spring-summer of 2003, while by June 2005, due to 
intensive competition domestically, VARIG declared bankruptcy.  
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featured Brazil and the winning Chinese women’s team (FIVB Past Events Info, 
2016).  
 
Figure 1: Macau Population 
 
 
 
The squeeze in Brazil’s 2015 total trade would not have been helpful to 
Macau-Brazil trade relations had Macau in fact been playing any role in this 
exchange. Brazil’s exports to China do not involve Macau, which has no 
capability of handling the large shipments of iron ore and soybeans. These are 
processed exclusively in Mainland China. Brazil’s trade with China has been of 
strategic significance for China and has not involved Macau as illustrated by trade 
milestones that include (i) supplying of iron ore from summer 1973, (ii) aircraft 
manufacture from 2001, and (iii) the launching of earth satellites from 2013. 
Despite Brazil generating trade surpluses with China of US$50.38 billion over the 
12 years between 2001 and 2013 (including a surplus of US$11.2 billion in 2014) 
(Brasil Ministério, 2014), no entity has sought to expand Macau’s role. Because 
the injection of a trade surplus into the Brazilian economy has been a source of its 
continuing growth and stability, it might have encouraged Brazilian authorities to 
consider widening Brazil’s operating base in China. Complementing the Japanese-
Brazilian community in Japan might have been a Brazilian cultural and economic 
base in Macau.  
Such a position in Macau should not have been difficult to achieve because 
trade between Brazil and China dwarfed Macau’s total economy, while Brazil was 
generating strong surpluses from its China trade. In 2010 Macau’s GDP of US$ 
28.36 (World Bank, Data, 2016) was only just over half of the volume of Brazil-
China trade that had hit approximately US$ 56.73 billion (Brazil Ministério, 
2016). But, closer Macau and Brazil relationships did not develop. Only one small 
advance in Brazil-Macau relations became evident with the 2009 opening of the 
low-impact “Casa de Brasil em Macau.” Brazil’s strategically significant trade 
markers with China had occurred without any involvement of Macau or any effort 
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to insert Macau in the China-Brazil link, by either widening Brazil’s base in Asia 
or by Brazil building a larger Lusophone trade and political polity.  
 
Trade Relationshiops: Brazil and Lusophonia 
 
The lack of significant relationship between Brazil and Macau is not altogether 
unique from Brazil’s relationships with the other key Lusophone nations that 
include Portugal, Angola, and Mozambique. Brazil’s trade with the “Lusophone 
community” is remarkably low, given the size of the Brazilian economy and its 
leading theoretical position in a “Lusophonia.” This is not surprising. Apart from 
Brazil, “Lusophonia” is actually the Portuguese Empire pre-1974, of which the 
non-Portuguese portion was known as the “Ultramar.” The economic relationships 
that existed pre-1974 in the Ultramar were based on Portugal’s support of 
expatriate Portuguese settlement in Angola and Mozambique combined with the 
needs of companies engaged in raw material extraction in Africa. Brazil had not 
been involved in these efforts, while the military conflicts in the Ultramar that 
arose post-independence shattered the Angolan and Mozambique economies and 
drove the Portuguese ex-pat communities from the countries. When Angola began 
to build its trade links to China in the late 1990s, Brazil was dealing with its own 
precarious financial situation. Trade data shows Brazil had little interest in 
building economic links to the former Portuguese Ultramar.  
 
Table 4: Brazil Exports to Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Brazil, 2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 225,099.61 100.0% 191,134.06 100.0% -15.1% 
China, P.R.: 
Mainland 
40,616.11 18.0% 35,607.52 18.6% -12.3% 
United States 27,144.93 12.1% 24,215.98 12.7% -10.8% 
Hong Kong 3,322.87 1.5% 2,108.00 1.1% -36.6% 
Angola 1,261.72 0.561% 647.99 0.339% -48.6% 
Portugal 1,060.26 0.471% 822.20 0.430% -22.5% 
Mozambique 63.86 0.028% 69.10 0.036% 8.2% 
Cabo Verde 21.27 0.009% 21.37 0.011% 0.5% 
Timor-Leste 4.94 0.002% 6.23 0.003% 26.1% 
Guinea-Bissau 2.56 0.001% 2.89 0.002% 12.6% 
São Tomé 0.67 0.000% 0.88 0.000% 31.3% 
Macao 0.52 0.000% 0.50 0.000% -4.5% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 2,415.81 1.073% 1,571.15 0.822% -34.964% 
 
As the IMF data below displays, Brazilian trade with Lusophonia remains 
extraordinarily weak. In 2015, the entire Lusophone market represented only 
0.82% of Brazil’s total exports (less than 1%). Hong Kong alone took more of 
Brazil’s exports than the entire Lusophone area. Stunningly, Brazil reported 
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negligible exports to Macau of only US$500,000 and the lowest to any Lusophone 
region. Brazilian exports to the Macau SAR are likely to be routed through Hong 
Kong and are not shown directly in trade statistics. Additionally, no Lusophone 
country was ranked as one of Brazil’s top 10 export markets or import suppliers. 
Despite being the second highest GDP of Lusophone GDP, in 2014 even Portugal 
only ranked as Brazil’s 41st largest export market with US$1.06 billion in 
revenues. Angola, though ranked above Portugal, stood in only 37th place with its 
Brazilian imports as reported by Brazil (not the IMF) totaling just US$1.26 billion 
(Brazil Ministério, 2015). By 2015 Angola’s imports from Brazil had dropped -
48.6%, and it was receiving just 0.34% of Brazil’s exports (Table 4.0). 
The 2015 trade situation for Brazil’s imports reflected an even worse position 
for the Lusophonia grouping. Brazil’s imports from the region represented only 
0.5% of its total imports, with Angola and Portugal being the only significant 
suppliers. Nothing was exported to Brazil from four of the poorest Lusophonia 
states, while Macau only sent US$5.4m of goods, just 0.003% of Brazil’s total 
imports.  
 
Brazil and the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), 1997 
 
There are historical roots to the low level of Macau interface with Brazil. The 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) that hit Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Korea through the summer and fall of 1997 massively and 
negatively impacted an Asian economic arena to which Brazil was not 
significantly tied. The AFC not only popped the regional real estate bubble, but it 
reinforced the specific downturn in the Macau market that the city had already 
been experiencing in the aftermath of the opening of Macau’s new airport in 
November 1995. Macau ‘s economic profile sunk as the Hong Kong Stock Market 
collapsed 30% in late October 1997, and the profits of Macau’s key commercial 
entity, the non-publicly traded, Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau, SA; 
(STDM; 澳門旅遊娛樂股份有限公司) dropped 50% (Gunn, 2005, p. 136). By 
November 1997 Portugal’s national flag carrier had stopped flying to the newly 
opened Macau airport. The AFC ended Macau’s boom and forestalled any 
development of Macau-Brazil trade relations that the Brazil-Macau Air Transport 
Agreement of July 1994 might have supported. 
The AFC also impacted Brazil, deflecting the country’s leadership (Henrique 
Cardoso) from any effort to expand the economic interface with Asia. 
International fund managers suggested that Brazil’s finance structure resembled 
that of the stricken Asian nations and issued warnings that Brazil was a possible 
new problem (Skidmore, 1999, p. 233). With strong pressure against its currency, 
Brazil heightened its interest rates to a crushing 43%. This drastically shrank 
domestic demand. The following August of 1998, after the AFC tsunami hit 
Russia with debt defaults and Ruble devaluation, Brazil again was struck by a 
massive drop in its currency reserves and the need to arrange for a bailout package 
from the IMF and the US treasury. Brazil’s currency reserves shrank from US$73 
billion to US$47 billion while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was forced 
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to extend a US$41.5b rescue package (Gordon, 2001, pp. 190-191). In Brazil no 
attention could be spared on the minor issue of Macau’s coming handover to 
China.  
The year 1999 provided no relief. Having dodged the disastrous economic 
situations in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and Russia, Brazil still had to deal with a 
rising inflation rate near 9%, fiscal budget deficits, and heavy debt service. 
Confronted by a major current account deficit of (US$24.4 billion) that generated 
and even greater external debt, Brazilian monetary authorities pushed domestic 
interest rates to 49% p.a., which reduced the trade deficit to a (US$1.2 billion), but 
precluded any growth based on domestic consumer or business demand. For the 
three years from 1997 through 1999, Brazil’s first priority had been to stabilize its 
own economy. No residual resources or time was available to deal with the tiny 
economy and city of Macau.  
 
Table 5: Brazil Imports from Lusophonia (US$ millions) 
(International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Brazil, 2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 251,966.03 100.0% 188,601.9  100.0% -15.1% 
China, P.R.: Mainland 41,074.67 18.2% 33,790.98 17.7% -17.7% 
United States 38,829.05 17.2% 29,435.74 15.4% -24.2% 
Hong Kong 976.56 0.4% 679.76 0.4% -30.4% 
Angola 1,220.80 0.542% 35.03 0.018% -97.1% 
Portugal 1,205.89 0.536% 890.36 0.466% -26.2% 
Mozambique 11.23 0.005% 20.83 0.011% 85.5% 
Cabo Verde 0.09 0.000% 0.03 0.000% -62.8% 
Timor-Leste 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
Guinea-Bissau 0.08 0.000% 0.55 0.000% 571.3% 
São Tomé 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% -35.8% 
Macao 16.19 0.007% 5.36 0.003% -66.9% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 2,454.28 1.090% 952.18 0.498% -61.203% 
 
Macau’s Return to China 
 
Macau’s return to China in late December 1999 theoretically might have removed 
the city from the constraints of it having been under the limited Portuguese 
economic network, opening it to playing a larger role in an expanded Lusophone 
commercial world. But, the realities of Brazil’s financial struggles and the need 
for China to smoothly integrate Macau into its newly minted policy of “One 
Country, Two Systems,” kept the two countries of Brazil and China firmly 
focused on their own domestic priorities. China only established its “Macau 
Forum” (Fórum para a Cooperação Económica entre a China e os Países de 
Língua Portuguesa), in October 2003, four years after the city’s handover to 
China. And, there was some ambiguity in its mission: was its major function to 
148 Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
enhance China’s relationship with Lusophonia, or to build the Macau’s interface? 
In any event, Macau was preoccupied with creating its new international casino 
economy that had a profitability which dwarfed all other possible economic or 
political initiatives of the city, and transfixed its leadership. In these first years, 
neither Macau nor China realistically gave any significant priority to building 
Macau’s economic links to those non-Brazilian Lusophone nations who were 
struggling out of post-colonial conflicts and whose economies were minute, with 
the exception of Angola.  
From China’s perspective, links to Brazil had been handled successfully from 
Beijing since the two countries had established diplomatic relations in August of 
1974, 25 years before. Macau could add nothing to these strategic links, which 
were already in place. In Macau the opening of its gaming industry to 
international investors in February 2002 targeted three top American gaming 
companies Las Vegas Sands, Wynn Resorts, and MGM. Also coming to the city 
was a new Hong Kong-Australian firm (Melco Entertainment) that had its primary 
listing in New York City, and one Hong Kong-based real estate and construction 
materials firm (Galaxy Entertainment). The Lusophone world, which included 
Brazil and the former Portuguese Ultramar, had no relationship to this effort.  
Massive earning from gaming industry investments hypnotized attention and 
monopolized resources, with activities that included building links to Brazil and 
the old Ultramar relegated to low-budget public relations activities. The only 
significant visit to the Macau SAR from Brazil since the handover, were the 
uneventful visits by Brazil’s vice president Michel Temer in the fall of 2013 for 
the 10th anniversary of the Macau Forum and the cameo appearance almost a 
decade earlier in the fall of 2004 of Brazil’s Minister of Culture and one of the 
country’s greatest musical artists, Gilberto Gil. His visit was incidental to his main 
purpose of visiting Hong Kong, not Macau, during the Hong Kong music festival. 
Up until Michel Temer in 2013, Gil was highest ranking Brazilian official ever to 
have visited Macau. Clearly Brazil has not had Macau high on its list of priorities 
for Asia.  
 
Table 6: Balance of Payments Macao SAR (10 million MOP) 
 
 2002 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Current 
Account 
18.712.8 96,766.7 126,978.0 143,467.8 175,265.2 168,383.0 
Goods -7,364.5 -43,706.6 -62,491.1 -70,641.1 -85,440.2 -98,190.6 
Services 26,417.7 171,070.8 234,023.5 270,844.3 333,420.5 339,399.3 
Primary 
income 
-92.6 -24,352.9 -39,984.5 -51,163.2 -64,867.1 -63,070.3 
Secondary 
income 
-247.7 -6,244.5 -4,569.9 -5,572.2 -7,848.1 -9,755.3 
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Macau’s Major Trading Partners: Hong Kong and China 
 
Macau’s structure of trade reflects the domination of its gaming industry over 
traditional import and export trade. As below, the latest figures provided by the 
Macau government (Macau Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e 
Censos, 2016) show that in 2014 Net Services generated positive revenues of 
MOP 339.4 billion (US$42.4b) versus a loss of MOP 98.1billion (US$12.2b) on 
the merchandise account. Also displayed is the remarkable jump in revenues that 
has occurred since the opening of the gaming industry to international operators in 
2002. Gaming revenues are up MOP 313 billion (US$ 39b), 12.8 times the level 
of 2002: 
Detailed reporting on the structure of services presented in the chart that 
follows also reveals that the “Travel Sector,” which incorporates gaming revenues 
is the overwhelming source of Macau’s Service revenue. Of total 2014 exports of 
services of MOP 424 billion, fully 96% (MOP 407billion) were generated by the 
Travel Sector. The lack of importance of Macau’s merchandise exports is also 
demonstrated by the fact that 2014 exports of goods stood at just MOP 15.2 
billion, only 3.6% of the volume of services exports.  
China (64.3%), Hong Kong (21.7%), and Taiwan (4.1%) generated 90.1% of 
all gaming tourists as of June 2016, with other close-in components of Greater 
China that included Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia pulling in 
another 3.1%. There were no gaming tourists to any significant degree generated 
from the Lusophone world, including Brazil, Portugal, and Angola (Macau 
Government Tourist Office, 2016).  
With respect to merchandise trade as of 1Q 2016 as exhibited in the chart 
below, Macau’s major merchandise export market is Hong Kong with 60.3% of its 
total exports, followed by China with 16.4%. Its major suppliers are also China 
with 36.1% and Hong Kong with 9.2% (Macau Government, Direcção dos 
Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016). Importantly, as in the official Macau 
graphic below, no Lusophone nation appears in its summary trade statistics, 
including that from the largest two Lusophone economies, Brazil and Portugal, 
and the two largest countries of Portugal’s former Ultramar, Angola, and 
Mozambique. Significantly, the Macau government does not report any significant 
import or export merchandise trade with Brazil on its main statistics site (Macau 
Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016).  
Macau is primarily an importer of goods, as its export earnings come from 
gaming services not from product export. Trade numbers reported to the IMF by 
Macau showed that in 2015 Brazil provided only 0.38% of Macau’s total imports. 
The IMF data (Table 8.0) also demonstrated that while Macau is a relatively large 
market with imports of goods of US$11.3 billion in 2014 and US$10.6 billion in 
2015, Brazil plays no role there. On the export side, Macau is a much smaller 
exporter of product as displayed in Table 9.0.  
Of note is the issue that while the IMF provides comprehensive data on 
mutual trade, there are differences between what countries report for their 
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respective mutual imports and exports. The IMF data from Brazil, Macau, and 
Hong Kong for trade between Brazil-Macau and for Hong Kong-Macau shows 
large discrepancies. The IMF claims privately that this results from Hong Kong 
being a transit shipment point for Macau’s merchandise trade. Any product that 
touches Hong Kong shore in transit is apparently claimed by Hong Kong to be a 
Hong Kong export. The size of the discrepancy between Hong Kong and Macau 
data is startling and points to inconsistent data collection between the two SARs. 
Macau reports to the IMF as in Table 8.0 that Hong Kong supplies 10.3% of 
Macau’s total imports, or US$1.156. Hong Kong on the other hand reports that its 
exports to Macau are in the order of US$6 billion. This problem in the IMF-
Macau-Hong Kong statistical system should be resolved.  
 
Table 7：Balance of Payments Components: Current Account (10 
million MOP) 
 
Standard 
Component 2002 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Current 
account 18,712.8 96,766.7 126,978.0 143,467.8 175,265.2 168,383.0 
Credit 63,123.9 249,679.8 342,196.4 393,410.0 464,566.1 475,316.2 
Debit 44,411.1 152,913.1 215,218.4 249,942.2 289,300.9 306,933.2 
Goods -7,364.5 -43,706.6 -62,491.1 -70,641.1 -85,440.2 -98,190.6 
Exports 18,925.4 8,324.0 9,024.9 11,839.1 12,694.6 15,197.4 
Imports 26,289.9 52,030.6 71,516.0 82,480.2 98,134.8 113,388.0 
Services 26,417.7 171,070.8 234,023.5 270,844.3 333,420.5 339,399.3 
Exports 39,707.5 232,118.0 319,479.6 362,451.1 428,377.3 424,390.8 
Transport 2,366.3 4,004.0 4,792.2 4,668.1 4,957.3 5,100.5 
Travel 35,431.4 222,475.8 308,391.8 350,433.4 414,296.9 407,414.6 
Financial 694.7 3,210.6 3,013.0 4,429.8 6,415.3 8,793.1 
Insurance / 
pension 128.6 244.2 293.1 405.5 514.0 735.4 
Other 1,086.5 2,183.6 2,989.5 2,514.4 2,193.9 2,347.1 
Imports 13,289.8 61,047.2 85,456.2 91,606.8 94,956.8 84,991.5 
Transport 940.7 2,405.8 3,052.6 3,052.8 3,537.2 3,869.8 
Travel 3,953.1 9,236.5 11,020.7 12,760.3 13,602.7 14,622.7 
Financial 639.6 1,824.5 2,288.1 2,837.7 2,501.6 2,751.3 
Insurance / 
pension 553.4 745.5 850.5 1,083.1 1,292.3 1,331.8 
Other 7,203.0 46,834.8 68,244.3 71,873.0 74,023.0 62,416.0 
 
Brazil in the data shown in Table 4.0 reported in 2014 and 2015 that its 
exports to Macau were stunningly low, said to be only US$500,000 in 2015 and 
even smaller amount than the 2014 level: a mere US$520,000. This ranked Macau 
as Brazil’s 171st export market out of 181 countries. However, Macau reported 
per Table 8.0 below that Brazil’s exports to the Macau SAR stood at US$41.38m 
in 2014 and US$40.38 in 2015. An explanation from the IMF and the customs 
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authorities of these countries is needed over these significant differences. 
Nevertheless, even the higher numbers from Macau demonstrate that Brazil, the 
largest Lusophone economy, is not playing a significant role in Macau. 
 
Table 8: Macau Imports from Lusophonia and the World (US$ 
millions) (International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Macau, 
2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 11,262.14 100.0% 10,627.18 100.0% -15.1% 
China 3,735.63 33.2% 3,590.35 33.8% -3.9% 
Hong Kong 1,156.16 10.3% 934.01 8.8% -19.2% 
United States 733.18 6.5% 712.18 6.7% -2.9% 
Euro Area 2,445.12 21.7% 2,116.17 19.9% -13.5% 
Brazil 41.38 0.367% 40.38 0.380% -2.4% 
Angola 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
Portugal 31.00 0.275% 34.88 0.328% 12.5% 
Mozambique 0.01 0.000% 0.00 0.000% -100.0% 
Cabo Verde 0.00 0.000% 2.00 0.019% 0.0% 
Timor-Leste (n.d) n.d n.d n.d. n.d. n.d 
Guinea-Bissau 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
São Tomé 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% -100.0% 
TOTAL 
Lusofonia w/o 
Brazil 
31.01 0.275% 36.88 0.347% 18.9% 
TOTAL 
Lusofonia 72.39 0.643% 77.26 0.727% 6.716% 
 
Additionally, apart from the second largest Lusophone economy of Portugal, 
the remaining members of Lusophonia have virtually no role in Macau’s 
international trade relations. Given Portugal’s five century long relationship with 
the city Portugal’s level of exports to Macau is disappointing. Portugal sold the 
city just US$31m 2015. This was just 0.275% of Macau’s total imports of 
US$10.627 billion.  
Because Macau is predominantly a provider of gaming services, its export of 
product ranks considerably below its imports. Year 2015 shows that Macau 
exported only US$1.25b worth of product while importing US$10.6b, for a net 
trade deficit of US$9.35b. Gaming receipts covered the gap. Nevertheless, as 
reported by Brazil to the IMF, Brazil’s imports from Macau again demonstrate 
that Brazil, the largest Lusophone economy, and Macau, the rising Lusophone 
city, have an extremely low level of economic interface. Brazil’s imports from 
Macau in 2015 (Table 5.0) had dropped to only US$5.36 million versus the small 
US$16.2 million of 2014. These had already ranked Macau 94th out of Brazil’s 
total suppliers (International Monetary Fund, External Trade by Counterparts, 
2016). For the remainder of Lusophonia, as reported by Macau, the situation was 
152 Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
worse. Macau’s 2015 data (Table 9.0) clarified that the city was exporting a 
minimal amount to Portugal of US$100,000, and nothing to Brazil. For Macau, 
there apparently were no exports to any other Lusophone nation in 2015. As in a 
prior assessment of 2014 (Spooner, 2016), despite the stunningly successful 
growth of the Brazilian, Chinese, and Macau economies since China’s entry into 
the World Trade Organization in 2001, 
 
 . . . direct trade relations between Macau and Brazil are minimal. The two 
economies, to date, operate in completely distinct arenas: while Brazil provides 
resources to China’s expanding economy, Macau provides entertainment via its 
casino economy. Macau and Brazil have not yet developed a direct mechanism 
through which trade and social interaction can grow naturally and commensurate 
with each other’s booming economies. (p. 331) 
 
Figures 2 and 3: Merchandise Exports and Imports 
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Table 9: Macau Exports to Lusophonia & World (US$ 
millions) (International Monetary Fund, 2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 1,241.33 100.0% 1,249.77 100.0% -15.1% 
China 194.58 15.7% 228.01 18.2% 17.2% 
Hong Kong 727.69 58.6% 792.39 63.4% 8.9% 
United States 36.71 3.0% 24.60 2.0% -33.0% 
Euro Area 34.67 2.8% 25.34 2.0% -26.9% 
Brazil 0.06 0.005% 0.00 0.000% -100.0% 
Angola 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
Portugal 0.30 0.000% 0.10 0.008% -65.6% 
Mozambique 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
Cabo Verde 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
Timor-Leste (n.d) n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d 
Guinea-Bissau 0.04 0.000% 0.00 0.000% -100.0% 
São Tomé 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
TOTAL Lusofonia w/o 
Brazil 0.34 0.000% 0.10 0.008% -69.7% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 0.40 0.032% 0.10 0.008% -74.232% 
 
Hong Kong’s Trade with Brazil and Lusophonia 
 
The level of trade between Hong Kong and Brazil is massive when compared to 
Macau. It assuredly is based upon Hong Kong’s commercial infrastructure that 
included its major bank (HSBC) having been one of Brazil’s largest Banks up 
until August 2015. Hong Kong reports that its level of trade with Brazil, which 
was US$3.4b in 2015, is far in excess of anything Macau might contemplate for a 
considerable period into the future. Hong Kong’s 2015 exports to Brazil of US$ 
1.375b (Table 10.0), despite being -26.6% lower than 2014’s US$1.874b, 
overwhelmed Macau’s virtual absence of any exports (Table 9.0). Hong Kong’s 
2015 imports from Brazil of US$2.11b also were substantially higher than its 
exports, despite a 28.5% reduction from 2014’s US$2.954 (Table 11.0).  
However, comparing Brazil’s trade to China with its trade with Hong Kong 
shows that even Hong Kong plays a relatively minor role in Brazil’s interface with 
China. In 2015 Brazilian exports to Hong Kong of US$ 2.11 billion were only 
5.9% of Brazil’s exports to China of US$ 35.6 billion (Table 4.0). For Brazil 
though, its Hong Kong trade generates attractive returns. Brazilian data (Table 
5.0) shows imports from Hong Kong in 2015 were US$ 680m (versus US$ 977m 
the year before), netting Brazil an attractive US$ 1.42 billion from its Hong Kong 
commerce. Nevertheless with total 2015 Brazil-Hong Kong trade of US$2.78 
billion representing only 4.2% of the Brazil-China trade of US$ 66.1 billion, 
Brazil’s main focus will be on the China mainland, not Hong Kong. Macau is not 
likely to be even an afterthought.  
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Table 10: HK Exports to Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International 
Monetary Fund Direction of Trade HK, 2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 473,964.50 100.0% 465,483.27 100.0% -15.1% 
China 255,337.23 53.9% 249,945.55 53.7% -2.1% 
United States 44,149.88 9.3% 44,281.58 9.5% 0.3% 
Euro Area 31,925.72 6.7% 30,658.72 6.6% -4.0% 
Brazil 1,874.00 0.395% 1,375.65 0.296% -26.6% 
Angola 155.41 0.033% 96.93 0.021% -37.6% 
Portugal 282.39 0.060% 253.36 0.054% -10.3% 
Mozambique 76.79 0.016% 52.46 0.002% -31.7% 
Cabo Verde 5.94 0.001% 2.05 0.000% -65.5% 
Timor-Leste (n.d.) n.d n.d n.d. n.d. n.d 
Guinea-Bissau 1.00 0.000% 2.05 0.000% 104.6% 
São Tomé 2.15 0.000% 1.94 0.000% -9.7% 
TOTAL Lusofonia w/o 
Macau & Brazil 523.67 0.110% 408.78 0.078% -21.9% 
Macao 6,296.77 1.329% 6,021.02 0.264% -4.4% 
TOTAL Lusofonia w/o 
Brazil 6,820.44 1.439% 6,429.80 0.342% -5.7% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 8,694.44 1.834% 7,805.45 1.677% -10.2% 
 
With respect to Lusophonia outside of Brazil, Hong Kong’s trade is not of 
critical size for Hong Kong, but it is far larger than that of Macau’s negligible 
levels. Concentrated in Angola, Portugal, and Mozambique this commerce 
generates for Hong Kong over half a billion U.S. dollars annually, which in 2015 
included US$408m of exports and US$155m of imports. As with Brazil and 
China, the four small Lusophone nations of Cabo Verde, Timor-Leste, Guinea-
Bissau, and Principe-Sao Tome seem to have virtually no significant trade with 
Hong Kong.  
As demonstrated in the data Hong Kong provides to the IMF, competition 
between Macau and Hong Kong might be observable through the levels of trade 
that the two SARs report into the IMF. Hong Kong’s data shows that its exports to 
Macau, which stood at US$6 billion in 2015 (Table 8.0), are massively larger than 
the figures reported by the Macau government. According to Macau its 2015 
imports from Hong Kong stood at only US$934 (Table 6.0), creating a reporting 
gap between Macau and Hong Kong of US$5 billion dollars. IMF puts this 
problematic issue on the back of the Hong Kong government, reporting that all 
goods transshipped thru Hong Kong are claimed as Hong Kong exports. Other 
explanations for the discrepancy may be: (i) a flaw in the IMF trade statistics 
collection system, (ii) the Macau government wishing to minimize general 
knowledge of the level of influence that Hong Kong maintains over the Macau 
economy, or (iii) the Hong Kong government being not sufficiently rigorous in its 
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export categorization. Given that both SARs are under the sovereignty of Beijing, 
this unsettling discrepancy should be rectified with the IMF assisting in its 
resolution. 
 
Table 11: HK Imports from Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade HK, 2016) 
 
Year 2014 % 2015 % 2015-2014 % 
World 544,937.20 100.0% 522,599.87 100.0% -15.1% 
China 256,544.84 47.1% 256,158.59 49.0% -0.2% 
United States 28,413.61 5.2% 27,305.36 5.2% -3.9% 
Euro Area 30,859.72 5.7% 27,389.90 5.2% -11.2% 
Brazil 2,954.65 0.542% 2,112.16 0.404% -28.5% 
Angola 18.23 0.003% 24.12 0.005% 32.3% 
Portugal 145.00 0.027% 125.26 0.024% -13.6% 
Mozambique 2.91 0.001% 5.59 0.001% 92.0% 
Cabo Verde 0.07 0.000% 0.05 0.000% -32.2% 
Timor-Leste (n.d.) n.d n.d n.d. n.d. n.d 
Guinea-Bissau 0.00 0.000% 0.00 0.000% 0.0% 
São Tomé 0.01 0.000% 0.06 0.000% 905.9% 
TOTAL Lusofonia  
w/o Macau & Brazil 166.21 0.031% 155.08 0.030% -6.7% 
Macao 814.66 0.149% 922.12 0.176% 13.2% 
TOTAL Lusofonia  
w/o Brazil 980.87 0.180% 1,077.21 0.206% 9.8% 
TOTAL Lusofonia 3,935.51 0.722% 3,189.36 0.610% -19.0% 
 
Institutional Change in China’s Macau Forum 
 
Given the low level of progress in expanding trade relations between Macau and 
Lusophonia since the opening of China’s Macau Forum over a decade ago in 
2003, despite its mandate to focus on trade and economic relationships, one 
should not be surprised to observe significant management change in the 
organization. To that effect, in late June of 2016 the Macau based O Clarim 
newspaper reported (O Clarim, 2016) that the new Secretary General and head of 
the Macau Forum was to be Ms. Xu Yingzhen (徐迎真), presently Deputy 
Director of the Department of American and Oceania Affairs of China’s Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) under Director Jiang Shan江山. Additionally, on July 
1, 2016, Wang Zhimin (王志民), one of three deputy directors of the State 
Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Office (港澳辦) replaced Li Gang (李剛), who 
since late 2012 had been the Director of the China’s Liaison Office in Macau (中
央人民政府駐澳門特別行政區聯絡辦公室). No specific reason was given for 
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the change other than health issues, while Li Gang has not been criticized for 
actions during his Macau tenure.  
The expected arrival of Ms. Xu in November 2016 would seem to signal 
China’s new emphasis on Brazil, for which she has had extensive responsibility at 
a senior level in MOFCOM. She will replace Chang Hexi (常和喜), a Portuguese-
speaking Chinese diplomat with experience in Lisbon who had been appointed to 
the position seven years ago in September 2009 following the death in office in 
July 2008 of Zhao Chuang (趙闖). Also leaving the Macau Forum will be the 
head of administration (Coordenadora do Gabinete de Administração do 
Secretariado Permanente), Ms. Zhang Jie (張杰) for whom a replacement has not 
been announced. In 2008 it took almost a year and half to find a replacement for 
the deceased Zhao Chuang, leading some to speculate that China was 
downgrading the Forum. Zhao had only been in office four months when he died, 
having been elected in March 2008 to replace Wang Chengan (王成安), a long-
time African specialist familiar with the African liberation movements. Wang had 
been Secretary General since its 2003 founding.  
In addition to changes on the PRC side, three significant changes recently 
materialized on the Macau side. Long-term Macau representative Rita Santos 
Rosario (Secretária-Geral Adjunta do Secretariado Permanente do Fórum de 
Macau), who had been with the organization since its inception, was replaced in 
March 2015 by Echo Chan, the Executive Director for Macau’s Trade and 
Investment Promotion Institute (IPIM). Ms. Chan remained just half a year until 
October 2015 when she resigned for personal reasons to take up residence in 
Brazil. Her replacement is Cristina Morais, the former head of External Economic 
Relations of the Macau Economic Services Department. The Macau Forum’s new 
officers from China and Macau will be confronting significant challenges.  
 
Macau After 2015 
 
Macau’s pre-occupation with its own development and gaming industry has been 
heightened since mid-2014, as a downturn in gaming revenues has focused 
Macau’s leaders on the future of their own key industry. Initiatives with 
Lusophonia will not take a priority over restructuring Macau’s gaming business. 
Macau’s reliance on the gaming industry was heightened between 2008 and 2014 
when three new mega-casinos were added to its casino inventory. During the 
period Macau’s gaming revenues tripled, rising from MOP 109.8 billion to MOP 
352.8 billion.  
The gaming industry, however, expected an even greater growth. US$22 
billion is being invested in new facilities. Macau gaming concession holders have 
launched plans for six new casinos on the Cotai Strip to be opened 2015 -2017. 
These include (i) the Galaxy Casino Project Phase II of US$ 5.5 billion that 
opened in May 2015 (GGRAsia, 2015b), (ii) Melco Crown’s Studio City of US$ 
3.2 billion that opened in October 2015 (Studio City Macau, 2015), (iii) The 
Parisian of LVS of US$ 2.5 billion scheduled in second half of 2016 (Parisian 
Macau, 2015), (iv) Wynn Resorts Casino of US$ 4 billion scheduled for August 
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2016 (Stynes, 2016), (v) MGM-Macau’s of US$ 2.9 billion casino scheduled for 
first part of 2017 (Stutz, 2016), and (vi) SJM’s colossus of US$ 3.9 billion, the 
Lisboa Palace, scheduled to open in 4Q 2017 (GGRAsia, 2015a).  
Just as implementation of these plans began, China’s new leadership launched 
an anti-corruption campaign on Mainland China that caused a sharp drop in 
Macau’s gaming revenues. From a high point of MOP 102 billion that was 
reached in 1Q 2014, gaming revenues shrank a dramatic 46.7% to MOP 54.6 
billion 18 months later (by 3Q 2015). Macau government reported that quarterly 
levels stopped falling in late 2015 and rose 3.27% to MOP 56.3 billion by the end 
of 1Q 2016, but the hoped for bottoming out has not materialized.  
Just released reports for June 2016 indicate a continuing contraction. In June 
casino gross gaming revenue declined by 8.5% over the previous June and stood 
at MOP15.9b (US$1.99 billion). This is the lowest monthly figure since 
September 2010, when revenues were MOP15.30b. Revenues of MOP107.79b for 
the first six months of 2016 also showed a drop of 11.4% over 2015 despite the 
up-tick in 1Q (GGRAsia, 2016).  
Despite the downturn, the Macau gaming industry has not collapsed: 1Q 2016 
revenues were 203.2% over those of the base year of 1Q 2007 (Macau 
Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016). Nevertheless, 
the unexpected fall of revenues, which directly impact the funds flowing to the 
Macau government, cannot help but affect Macau’s new large-scale casino 
projects as well as nature of the facilities that each will offer. One can expect 
delays in casino openings, smaller casino operators being forced from the market, 
and new policies from Beijing to address the transition in Macau’s gaming 
industry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Present trade data for Macau demonstrates the significance of the Gravity Model 
of international trade that predicts that Macau’s trade will remain in the close orbit 
of China, Macau’s massive sovereign authority. The pull of Brazil, Portugal, and 
Angola will only be weakly felt. Ghemawat’s CAGE model reinforces the reality 
that Macau’s economic relationships will be inextricably linked with China: 
Macau is overwhelmingly a Chinese community, with only residual Portuguese 
cultural and linguistic influence, while its political and legal development is 
directly under Beijing’s control. Macau’s present merchandise trade pattern 
exhibits a tight relationship with Hong Kong and China, with a much lesser role 
being played by the European Union, the United States, and Japan. There is 
virtually no trade with the Lusophone world, including a relatively weak 
relationship with Portugal. In the critical services sector, 91% of Macau’s clients 
are coming directly from Greater China. No Lusophone nations are listed as client 
sources.  
Macau’s minimal level of trade with the Lusophone World in either goods or 
services has not been reversed by the decade-long attempt to build China’s  
 
158 Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
Table 12: Macau Gaming 2007-2016 Quarterly (Macau Government, 
Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, July 2016) 
 
    Gross 
Revenue 
    Tax from 
gaming 
Casino Gaming 
table 
Slot 
machine 
    Total 
(million 
MOP) 
% Change 
Q to Q 
% Change 
Base Yr 
million 
MOP 
No. No. No. 
2007 Qtr.1 18,598 100.0% 100.0% 7,023 25 2,970 7,349 
 Qtr.2 19,772 6.3% 6.3% 7,655 26 3,102 8,234 
 Qtr.3 20,535 3.9% 10.4% 7,223 27 3,992 11,510 
 Qtr.4 24,942 21.5% 34.1% 9,048 28 4,375 13,267 
2008 Qtr.1 30,085 20.6% 61.8% 10,777 29 4,311 13,552 
 Qtr.2 29,179 -3.0% 56.9% 11,076 30 4,277 12,956 
 Qtr.3 26,204 -10.2% 40.9% 11,024 31 4,312 12,835 
 Qtr.4 24,358 -7.0% 31.0% 9,020 31 4,017 11,856 
2009 Qtr.1 26,252 7.8% 41.2% 9,392 31 3,998 11,971 
 Qtr.2 25,619 -2.4% 37.8% 10,191 32 4,390 13,509 
 Qtr.3 32,036 25.0% 72.3% 11,116 33 4,610 14,175 
 Qtr.4 36,476 13.9% 96.1% 13,610 33 4,770 14,363 
2010 Qtr.1 41,248 13.1% 121.8% 14,900 33 4,811 14,503 
 Qtr.2 45,219 9.6% 143.1% 16,997 33 4,828 14,659 
 Qtr.3 47,723 5.5% 156.6% 17,362 33 4,838 14,316 
 Qtr.4 55,398 16.1% 197.9% 19,517 33 4,791 14,050 
2011 Qtr.1 58,835 6.2% 216.4% 21,864 33 4,853 13,787 
 Qtr.2 65,900 12.0% 254.3% 24,519 34 5,237 15,098 
 Qtr.3 70,521 7.0% 279.2% 26,371 34 5,379 15,900 
 Qtr.4 73,802 4.7% 296.8% 26,902 34 5,302 16,056 
2012 Qtr.1 74,596 1.1% 301.1% 27,748 34 5,242 16,102 
 Qtr.2 74,670 0.1% 301.5% 28,747 35 5,498 17,035 
 Qtr.3 74,854 0.2% 302.5% 28,000 35 5,497 17,029 
 Qtr.4 81,115 8.4% 336.1% 28,883 35 5,485 16,585 
2013 Qtr.1 85,600 5.5% 360.3% 31,217 35 5,749 16,406 
 Qtr.2 86,419 1.0% 364.7% 33,688 35 5,746 15,310 
 Qtr.3 89,447 3.5% 380.9% 33,406 35 5,748 14,775 
 Qtr.4 100,401 12.2% 439.8% 36,071 35 5,750 13,106 
2014 Qtr.1 102,491 2.1% 451.1% 37,976 35 5,700 13,232 
 Qtr.2 91,236 -11.0% 390.6% 37,377 35 5,710 12,895 
 Qtr.3 83,143 -8.9% 347.1% 31,925 35 5,697 12,584 
 Qtr.4 75,844 -8.8% 307.8% 29,432 35 5,711 13,018 
2015 Qtr.1 65,033 -14.3% 249.7% 25,383 35 5,704 12,688 
 Qtr.2 57,115 -12.2% 207.1% 23,112 35 5,814 14,192 
 Qtr.3 54,602 -4.4% 193.6% 25,383 35 5,704 12,688 
 Qtr.4 55,061 0.8% 196.1% 23,112 35 5,814 14,192 
2016 Qtr.1 56,389 2.4% 203.2% 25,383 35 5,704 12,688 
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relations to Lusophonia via the Macau Forum. Its new leadership in coordination 
with the China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has a formidable task ahead. 
In the meantime, the major expansion of Macau’s gaming infrastructure that 
is taking place in the face of a significant downturn in gaming revenue will 
preoccupy Macau’s key economic leadership over the next several years. The 
restructure is likely to bump up against the negotiations over gaming concession 
extensions that begin to expire in 2020. Key drivers of Macau gaming have been 
major American gaming operators, who would approach the potential Brazil 
gaming market from offices with responsibility for the Americas. There are no 
indications that Macau-Hong Kong based Galaxy, SJM, or Melco Crown, along 
with local junket operators, are playing any role in attempting to build a gaming 
industry in Brazil. The most significant non-Asian initiative of the locally based 
firms has been Galaxy’s investment in Monaco’s gaming monopoly, Société des 
Bains de Mer.  
With respect to Macau’s relationship with Lusophonia, the potential of a 
larger relationship might be gauged through the barometer of Macau’s trade with 
Brazil, which has an economy that dwarfs all other Lusophone GDPs combined. 
While both jurisdictions are theoretically part of the “Lusophone world,” Macau 
and Brazil have historically been in isolation from one another despite booming 
economies in Brazil, China, and Macau since China’s 2001 entry into the World 
Trade Organization. The IMF reports that Macau-Brazil trade was extraordinarily 
low in 2015 and even smaller than the minute level in 2014. Brazil’s primary 
economic relationships are with China and the United States, and that trade will 
not be rerouted through Macau any time soon. Additionally, Hong Kong, whose 
Brazilian trade represents approximately 4.2% of the volume of Brazil-China 
trade but generates $1.2 billion in surpluses for Brazil, will not be easily displaced 
from its present entrenched and superior position with Lusophonia.  
Providing a major stumbling block for Macau’s Lusophone efforts is the fact 
that Brazil’s relationships with China, which parallel its relationships with Angola 
and Mozambique, have had little to do directly with Portugal or Macau. Brazil-
China relationships developed bilaterally based upon the geo-political alignments 
that were in place and evolving between 1974 and 1999 and were not 
intermediated either through Macau, Portugal, or the former Portuguese Ultramar. 
Decades ago attempts were made to launch a Macau-Brazil economic relationship 
via the opening of a Banco do Brasil branch in Macau in June 1980 and the 
signing of Macau’s first international air treaty in July 1994, but these initiatives 
were insufficient to overcome the reality that the economic development of both 
Brazil and Macau was taking place in separate economic and political regions. 
Without Macau building an economic interface to Brazil, it is difficult to see how 
Macau might build a separate significant relationship with the much smaller, less 
developed, and politically more problematic nations that constitute the remaining 
portion of the Lusophone grouping.  
Part of the mandate of the incoming Secretary General of the Macau Forum, 
Ms. Xu Yingzhen (徐迎真), must certainly be to tackle the lack of success in 
building any trade between Macau and the Lusophone world over the last 12 years 
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despite the organization’s objectives. Ms. Xu will also need to address the 
strategic quandary of how to build relationships with Brazil in the face of its 
present difficult economic difficulties and Macau’s preoccupation with 
reconfiguring its gaming industry.  
The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Macau Forum scheduled for 
November 2016 will need to handle concretely the policy expressions by China 
and other Lusophonia countries to build and strengthen an operating global 
Lusophone network from China and Macau in the face of Macau’s weak 
merchandise trade with these nations. The city’s less-than-competitive 
international trade infrastructure will obstruct the effort, while the need to rebuild 
Macau’s gaming revenues and renegotiate gaming concessions will have priority.  
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APPENDIX I: China’s Lusophone Trade 3Q 2015 
 
Chinese trade data from the Macau Forum for the first three quarters of 2015 reinforces the 
reality that Brazil dominates the Chinese relationship with Lusophonia: Virtually all of 
China’s trade with Lusophonia (99.9%) was carried on with the four states of Brazil 
(72.7%), Angola (20.4%), Portugal (4.4%), and Mozambique (2.3%) (Macau Forum, 2015. 
The four smaller states of Timor-Leste, Cabo Verde, Guine-Bissau, and Sao Tome-Principe 
play very little role in China’s international trade. 
 
Table 13: China Trade with Lusophonia, 2015 January-September vs. 
2014 (US$000)  
 
Country 
Total Trade 
2015 
% 
Trade 
China 
Exports 2015 
China 
Imports 2015 
Total Trade 
2014 
% 
Change 
2014-15 
Brazil $55,608,303.5 72.7% $21,968,685.4 $33,639,618.0 $68,237,721.2 -18.5% 
Angola $15,564,352.5 20.4% $2,938,217.0 $12,626,135.6 $28,262,101.5 -44.9% 
Portugal $3,382,366.6 4.4% $2,195,249.9 $1,187,116.7 $3,613,305.5 -6.4% 
Mozambique $1,789,339.9 2.3% $1,450,747.7 $338,592.2 $2,329,132.3 -23.2% 
Timor-Leste $62,858.1 0.1% $62,179.4 $678.7 $41,324.3 52.1% 
Cabo Verde $35,326.2 0.0% $35,309.7 $16.5 $40,333.7 -12.4% 
Guine-Bissau $30,628.3 0.0% $12,907.7 $17,720.6 $60,609.7 -49.5% 
Sao Tome-
Principe $4,530.5 0.0% $4,520.8 $9.6 $2,824.5 60.4% 
Total $76,477,705.6 100.0% $28,667,817.6 $47,809,887.9 $102,587,352.7 -25.5% 
 
 
